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 ‘Is Anthropology Legal?’
Anthropology and the EU General Data 
Protection Regulation
Cassandra Yuill
ABSTRACT: In May 2018, the European Union (EU) introduced the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) with the aim of increasing transparency in data processing and enhancing 
the rights of data subjects. Within anthropology, concerns have been raised about how the new 
legislation will aﬀ ect ethnographic fi eldwork and whether the laws contradict the discipline’s 
core tenets. To address these questions, the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) at 
the University of London hosted an event on 25 May 2018 entitled ‘Is Anthropology Legal?’, 
bringing together researchers and data managers to begin a dialogue about the future of an-
thropological work in the context of the GDPR. In this article, I report and refl ect on the event 
and on the possible implications for anthropological research within this climate of increasing 
governance.
KEYWORDS: anonymity, archiving, data protection, data sharing, ethnography, GDPR, 
legislation, public anthropology
The recent introduction of the European Union Gen-
eral Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) on 25 May 
2018 will no doubt have a range of implications for 
anthropological research and practice, but what will 
the extent of these implications be and how can we 
expect them to shape future work and methodologi-
cal developments? In early May, I spent an aĞ ernoon 
at a half-day workshop, hosted by the School of 
Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of 
London, which set out to clarify the recent legislation 
and tackle the issues and challenges born at the in-
terface of new regulatory frameworks, technological 
advancements and anthropological fi eldwork. In this 
article, I set out to report and refl ect on the workshop 
and the possible futures, both hopeful and murky, 
that we are being propelled to by the evolving legis-
lation of governance.
What Is the GDPR?
By now, in Europe, our inboxes have been fl ooded 
with e-mails similar to Figure 1 alerting us to the up-
date in privacy policies and requesting consent to 
continue using our personal data for marketing pur-
poses. The eﬀ ect of the GDPR has been widespread 
from inboxes to cookie fl ags at the boĴ om of websites 
to university data guidelines. The most practically 
elucidating part of my aĞ ernoon at the SOAS work-
shop centred on geĴ ing to know the GDPR as a piece 
of legislation, most of which appears to be targeted 
at companies, such as Virgin Trains East Coast, but 
some of which aﬀ ects research communities globally. 
The bare bones of the new legislation consists of an 
aĴ empt to establish further transparency and ac-
countability about how data is processed and used 
and to provide enhanced rights for individuals. In 
doing so, the GDPR gives individuals greater control 
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over their personal data and strengthens their previ-
ous rights from the Data Protection Act while also 
unifying European data protection rules and requir-
ing data controllers to provide clarity about how and 
why personal data is being processed. It also inhabits 
a section of law, data protection, that is particularly 
fl uid, which means that interpretations are variable 
and potentially subject to change.
The articles pertaining to the grounds for process-
ing personal data, the territorial scope of research, 
and anonymity are pertinent to anthropologists, and 
provide the best spaces for consideration and cri-
tique. The primary grounds for processing personal 
data, for example, may no longer require consent 
from the data subject; instead, it could be obtained if 
research is deemed to be in the ‘public interest’, and 
this presents a contradiction: pursuing this clause as 
the primary grounds for processing personal data 
removes power that individuals have over their 
rights, even though the new GDPR is centred on their 
protection and enhancement. Put simply, who de-
cides what is in the public interest and what is not? 
Since the GDPR’s adoption, research councils and 
universities alike have taken on the public interest 
data processing clause, and reactions from the an-
thropological sphere have been mixed. One aĴ endee 
at the SOAS workshop declared that processing 
on the basis of public interest ‘makes us no beĴ er 
than journalists’, while some may see the change as 
providing a legal basis for established anthropologi-
cal research methods and ethics. If the laĴ er is true, 
then we fi nd our answer to the eponymous ques-
tion, and anthropologists can now focus on the lo-
gistics of including the public interest clause on their 
consent forms, which is required under the GDPR.
Consent is an area in which the new legislation 
will likely aﬀ ect how anthropologists conduct ethno-
graphic studies. The processes for consent in ethnog-
raphy and in the GDPR are at odds: while the former 
is fl uid and negotiated, the laĴ er is rigid and concrete. 
In anthropology, informed consent is gained, some-
times verbally, and then negotiated and renegotiated 
as fi eldwork progresses and evolves; there is an un-
derstanding built into the procedure that a researcher 
does not always know what will happen in the fi eld 
and how the scope of enquiry will extend and expand. 
Under the GDPR, clear and aﬃ  rmative consent must 
be gained for every research activity with a signa-
ture obtained on the doĴ ed line of a long form. While 
safeguarding the identities and rights of participants 
is at the core of each process, it will be diﬃ  cult for us 
as anthropologists to abide by the GDPR legislation 
when we are asked to obtain consent for research ac-
tivities that we do not yet know about. Discussions at 
the SOAS workshop revolved around how the GDPR’s 
notion of consent confl icts with the traditional an-
thropological method of participant observation and 
around what we, as practitioners of anthropology, 
should use as a basis for data processing if clear, af-
fi rmative consent is diﬃ  cult to obtain. There were also 
more specifi c concerns raised at the workshop about 
the feasibility of using paper consent forms or re-
cording verbal consent amongst activists and groups 
experiencing political pressure, where symbols of bu-
reaucracy and governmentality might induce mistrust.
Within the bounds of the new legislation, the an-
thropological consent process and its documentation, 
which are oĞ en connected to the relationships built 
during intensive fi eldwork, the nature of research 
collaboration, and the act of co-producing fi ndings 
have the potential to be thorny issues. There was 
a common thread during the SOAS workshop that 
focused on how the GDPR will alter research col-
laboration and co-production, on how it will aﬀ ect 
the territorial scope of research, and on under what 
conditions it will be applied geographically. Plainly 
put, the GDPR applies to:
•  EU researchers collecting and storing data in 
the United Kingdom or elsewhere;
•  EU and non-EU researchers collecting data out-
side the United Kingdom but storing it in the 
United Kingdom; and
•  Non-EU researchers collecting data on EU citi-
zens, regardless of where it is eventually stored.
Figure 1. Email from Virgin Trains East Coast requesting 
consent to transfer personal data
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The GDPR does not apply when non-EU research-
ers collect and store data outside the United Kingdom, 
but many aĴ endees were curious about collaborations 
between EU and non-EU researchers and how the 
legislation might impact on what and how ideas and 
data are shared. As with previous data protection 
laws, we must be aware of how to store and share 
data securely, despite the lure of new technologies 
streamlining international communication. Moving 
forward, ownership of ideas and authorship in re-
search conducted on a global scale may need to be 
re-navigated and renegotiated, particularly in the 
light of the increasing preference amongst scholars 
for collaboration (both within and across disciplines) 
and data sharing.
Archiving
Because the GDPR works to enhance transparency 
and accountability for individuals and their processed 
data, open-access or sharing research will likely be-
come progressively desirable, if not necessary. Dur-
ham University’s website, for example, reads: ‘Broadly 
speaking the University defi nes research as being in 
the public interest where the outputs of the research 
will be made publicly available without undue re-
striction’. The prospect of sharing all the aspects of 
research – including fi eld notes – sparked a discus-
sion at SOAS around the nature of anthropologi-
cal research, recording fi eld notes, and anonymity. 
What changes when we write fi eld notes not just for 
ourselves but for others, future and unknown? This 
maĴ er should be scrutinised, especially if anthro-
pologists deposit research into the United Kingdom 
Data Archive (UKDA), an archive that manages social 
science and humanities research and makes it avail-
able to other researchers. Currently, anthropologists 
seldom deposit their work into the archive, since we 
cannot confi rm the anonymity of our participants, a 
key requirement for maintaining open-access proj-
ects on the archive. Depositing into the UKDA is not 
strictly required, but, as Edward Simpson provoca-
tively pointed out, what if we have to do it in order 
to obtain funding? Archiving implicates three areas 
of data management – informed consent, protection 
of identities, and regulation of access – in pursuit of 
providing a service that is ‘as open as possible, as 
closed as necessary’. In order for anthropologists to 
engage with this framework, we must unpack how 
our ways of doing research negotiate and ensure each 
of these processes, an exercise that has the potential 
to illuminate where our research does not mesh with 
the new legislation. It is only then that we can visu-
alise the archived research project – where we have 
already unfolded and refolded our questions and 
wrangled the study documents, fi eld notes and tran-
scripts into a cohesive whole – ready to be audited by 
data managers and then neatly put on the proverbial 
shelf for later consideration.
Complying with the GDPR and archiving anthro-
pological research require a more thorough consent 
process, which must now detail exactly what par-
ticipants are giving consent for and must encompass 
participation, personal data usage and future infor-
mation usage by others. As a researcher with the Na-
tional Health Service (NHS), this granular consent 
process is typical for recruiting on clinical sites and 
necessary in order to obtain ethical approval to do so, 
even if this framework is ill-fi Ĵ ed for ethnographic 
projects. There is oĞ en tension between the phenom-
enological nature of anthropological research and 
unbending ethics procedures, which may not identify 
the extent to which refl exive practices remain central 
to and ground anthropology. In the GDPR, there are 
similar tensions when it comes to data sharing and 
anonymisation, which run counter to the self-gover-
nance that anthropologists employ during research 
and practice. There are several ways in which anthro-
pological research is regulated. One way is through 
the Association of Social Anthropology’s (ASA) code 
of conduct, which provides an ethical framework 
that relies on the researcher’s own ideas of good gov-
ernance and acceptable practice. The ASA guidelines 
emphasise that the researcher is at the centre of this 
ethical practice through being refl exive and receiving 
strong training, which should establish moral obliga-
tions, such as ensuring protection and trust, avoiding 
intrusion, and negotiating consent and relationships. 
These moral obligations and negotiated relationships 
engender the ‘meaningful involvement’ of individu-
als in research and can facilitate the co-production 
of data and analysis. What if these discipline-related 
moral obligations contradict the GDPR? We promise 
to ‘do no harm’ as anthropologists, but what if shar-
ing research fi ndings becomes harmful? Moreover, 
how does total anonymisation aﬀ ect co-production in 
research and the intellectual property rights of partic-
ipants, and would these two things still be possible?
‘Un-naming’
Despite this loosening of data-processing grounds, 
there are other articles within the GDPR that broaden 
the defi nition of anonymity to beĴ er serve the pro-
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tection of identities and data. Sharing on an archival 
platform is easier said than done, and it is not built 
into the research procedures of ethnography. Field 
notes are oĞ en personal and messy, and are oĞ en 
replete with details about places and people. Anony-
misation is a hazy place to stand as an anthropolo-
gist. Complete anonymisation murkies the waters for 
anthropologists. The GDPR clearly states that both 
direct and indirect data that can lead to identifi ca-
tion fall within the realm of personal data, and thus 
eﬀ orts must be made to absolutely anonymise this 
information. Codifi cation with a master key will not 
suﬃ  ce – this is called pseudonymisation – the key 
must be destroyed in order for complete anonymity, 
though, if personal data now includes indirect infor-
mation, can we ever truly anonymise data?
Pseudonymisation, as David Mosse pointed out 
during the SOAS workshop, is inherent in anthro-
pological practice, but ‘un-naming’ has repercus-
sions – once the master key is destroyed, so is the 
individual’s identity in the research, which can never 
be reclaimed by that person or their family members. 
The cleansing of personal data, direct and indirect, 
remains a mammoth task for qualitative researchers, 
but, realistically, is it even preferable to sterilise our 
research reports? Stripping away the personal data, 
particularly indirect personal data, arguably strips 
away the person, and anthropology is built upon 
writing about people, their lives, their practices and 
their being, so what would be leĞ  to deposit into an 
archive once those details are erased? Furthermore, 
there are issues with the anonymisation of those who 
explicitly do not want to be anonymous. Activists, 
for instance, may wish to remain named, in essence 
refusing to become ethnographic and retaining their 
identity as a political and personal force that cannot 
be generalised.
Anonymisation and the protection that it hypo-
thetically provides are further convoluted when par-
ticipants become unhappy with or object to research 
fi ndings. A prominent example is, of course, Nancy 
Scheper-Hughes’s ethnography (1979) of a rural Irish 
village exploring the high rates of hospitalised men-
tal illness in the country. The monograph received 
the Margaret Mead Award, but alighted controversy 
in the United States and Ireland. A journalist sub-
sequently identifi ed the village aĞ er asking local 
people and published a series of articles in The Irish 
Times. Two decades later, Scheper-Hughes retuned 
to the village only to be quickly forced to leave, an 
experience which she poignantly recounts in an ar-
ticle (2000) that refl ects on her research, the following 
controversy and the nature of intrusion, protection 
and anonymity in anthropological research. It is an 
intimate account that is critical of refl exivity, citing its 
shortcomings in trying to peel back our own subjec-
tivities, and it charges the practice of anonymisation 
with rendering our writing less altruistic and more 
benefi cial to the researcher:
Still, were I to be writing the book for the fi rst time 
and with hindsight, of course there are things I 
would do diﬀ erently. I would be inclined to avoid 
the ‘cute’ and ‘conventional’ use of pseudonyms. 
Nor would I aĴ empt to scramble certain identifying 
features of the individuals portrayed on the naive as-
sumption that these masks and disguises could not 
be rather easily decoded by the villagers themselves. 
I have come to see that the time-honoured practice 
of bestowing anonymity on ‘our’ communities and 
informants fools few and protects no one—save, per-
haps, the anthropologist’s own skin. And I fear that 
the practice makes rogues of us all—too free with our 
pens, with the government of our tongues, and with 
our loose traditions and interpretations of village life. 
(Scheper-Hughes 2000: 128)
‘Naming’, then, creates the possibility for more 
robust fi eldwork and reporting of fi ndings, and it en-
hances the ethical conduct of researchers who, with-
out the protection of anonymity, can no longer con-
ceal poor evidence. It is an exercise in transparency, 
which the GDPR espouses, albeit from a very diﬀ er-
ent viewpoint.
Like Nancy Scheper-Hughes, both Edward Simp-
son (2016) and David Mosse (2006) have encountered 
and wriĴ en on participants’ objections to their ethno-
graphic work, meditating on the ‘general disparity 
between how critical social anthropologists describe 
the world and how others see the world as working’ 
(Simpson 2016: 118) and on how the protection and 
preservation of anonymisation are associated with this 
gap. Jan Nespor (2000: 549) neatly sums up the issue:
Anonymization protects participants from identifi ca-
tion and consequent harm or embarrassment only 
insofar as local people have no objection to what’s 
wriĴ en (or cannot be bothered to read it) and what’s 
wriĴ en is of too liĴ le import to aĴ ract the scrutiny of 
outsiders.
The relationships between the researcher, the 
participants and the fi ndings appear to dictate how 
anonymisation functions, while the relationship of 
the outside world to research output establishes who 
ultimately benefi ts from anonymisation and indicates 
the reach of published work. At the SOAS work-
shop, David Mosse proposed that anthropologists be 
more judicious with anonymisation, discerning how 
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partnerships and ownership in research and knowl-
edge production are adjusted by the extent to which 
we ‘protect’ identities. Anonymising should not af-
fect collaboration, particularly with organisations, 
nor should it imply that collaboration was not de-
sirable; however, we should be concerned that the 
total anonymisation of participants and places di-
minishes co-production in research and the dis-
semination of research, in that we cannot co-produce 
with those who have been permanently un-named. 
Moreover, the anonymisation of indirect personal 
data implicates geographical area and period in his-
tory, eﬀ ectively disassociating time and place, which 
has ontological and political ramifi cations (Nespor 
2000). Can we understand how the hospital copes 
with changes to service implementation if we do not 
know the sociopolitical history and location of the 
hospital? Given these intricacies of identity, time, and 
place, anonymisation, especially in the new legisla-
tive context, demands more critical anthropological 
engagement.
We must adapt, but how much before experienc-
ing further limitations to the subjects we explore and 
the communities with which we interact? As Edward 
Simpson pointed out at the SOAS workshop, codifi -
cation and institutional demands oĞ en render mean-
ingful action increasingly diﬃ  cult, if not impossible, 
as they impose confl icting demands on social scien-
tists, and this tension is apparent in our treatment of 
anonymisation – or rather pseudonymisation – and 
the expectations of the GDPR and the archival frame-
work. It appears that Simpson is on the right track in 
suggesting that we need lawyers, not ethics commit-
tees, to help us navigate the complexities of the legis-
lation and how we adhere to it. To coexist and thrive, 
we will need to have an honest, consistent dialogue 
with data managers and a retooling of disciplinary 
frameworks of conduct, but this is merely a starting 
point. The ASA, for instance, is looking to amend its 
guidelines, with consultation amongst its member-
ship expected in the coming year; however, this and 
future discussions about the GDPR will soon need to 
bridge over to solutions concerning student training, 
research methods, funding and archiving.
Conclusion
When the day closed at SOAS, questions remained 
about what the GDPR actually means for anthropo-
logical practice, as opposed to what it could mean. 
There was a general consensus that the impact would 
be distributed generationally: seasoned researchers 
will need to adapt their practice and train students 
diﬀ erently, and graduate students, both current and 
future, will need to fi nd innovative ways to gain 
funding and manage their work in the face of po-
tential legislative challenges. I leĞ  that evening feel-
ing informed but unsatisfi ed about what to expect 
realistically and what a ‘precise’ discussion about 
anthropological practice under the GDPR will entail. 
The public interest clause, for example, will likely 
continue to be problematic, no maĴ er how much we 
charge the GDPR as legislation that brings power 
back to the people. These unanswered concerns, and 
the many I have raised above, leave the future murky, 
and I wonder whether my fellow aĴ endees also felt 
the weight of the unknowns.
Despite the murkiness that it creates, the GDPR 
oﬀ ers new but not entirely unfamiliar spaces for 
anthropologists, who, as a habit, discuss the ethical 
implications of ethnography and the role of anthro-
pology in the public sphere. Conducting research and 
processing data in the public interest gives weight and 
explicit legality to arguments about the legitimacy of 
the fi eld, while encouraging greater participation 
in archives provides visibility and fi lls in the gap of 
publicly available knowledge. AĞ er all, why should 
publicly funded anthropology not be publicly avail-
able? There are more personal reasons to embrace 
archiving and by default compliance with the GDPR; 
fi eld notes can function as a way to curate a body of 
work and oﬀ er readers the chance to understand the 
research through the writer. Despite the beauty and 
richness of building ethnographic records, the real-
ity of archiving studies and fi eld notes could alter 
the nature of co-production in research and become 
a burden, especially if they are of liĴ le interest to 
future readers or if they take on unintended mean-
ings. The question remains whether there is space 
to rectify these two views. This atmosphere of disso-
nance is prevalent in the ongoing discussions. Issues 
of harmonising the traditions of anthropology and 
the demands of the GDPR and with how we rise as a 
discipline to meet the ensuing challenges will unde-
niably usher in a new dimension to how anthropol-
ogy engages with the public.
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